Understanding the timing and magnitude of advertising spending patterns. by Gijsenberg, Maarten et al.
Understanding the timing and magnitude of 
advertising spending patterns
M.J. Gijsenberg, H.J. van Heerde, M.G. Dekimpe, J.-B.E.M. Steenkamp and V.R.Nijs
DEPARTMENT OF MARKETING AND ORGANISATION STUDIES (MO)






UNDERSTANDING THE TIMING AND MAGNITUDE 





Maarten J. Gijsenberg 
Harald J. van Heerde 
Marnik G. Dekimpe 
Jan-Benedict E.M. Steenkamp 















Maarten J. Gijsenberg is a Doctoral Candidate at the Catholic University of Leuven and Researcher in Marketing at 
the Louvain School of Management & FUCaM (e-mail: maarten.gijsenberg@fucam.ac.be). Harald J. van Heerde is 
Professor of Marketing at the Waikato Management School, University of Waikato (e-mail: 
heerde@mngt.waikato.ac.nz). Marnik G. Dekimpe is Research Professor of Marketing & CentER Fellow at Tilburg 
University, and Professor of Marketing at the Catholic University of Leuven (e-mail: m.g.dekimpe@uvt.nl). Jan-
Benedict E.M. Steenkamp is C. Knox Massey Distinguished Professor of Marketing and Marketing Area Chair, 
Kenan-Flager Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (e-mail: jbs@unc.edu). Vincent R. Nijs 
is Assistant Professor of Marketing at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (e-mail: v-
nijs@kellogg.northwestern.edu). 
  1UNDERSTANDING THE TIMING AND MAGNITUDE 






Notwithstanding the fact that advertising is one of the most used marketing tools, little is  
known about what is driving (i) the timing and (ii) the magnitude of advertising actions. Building 
on normative theory, the authors develop a parsimonious model that captures this dual investment 
process. They explain advertising spending patterns as observed in the market, and investigate the 
impact of company, competitive, and category-related factors on these decisions, thereby 
introducing the novel concept of Ad-sensor. Analyses are based on a unique combination of (i) 
weekly advertising data on 748 CPG brands in 129 product categories in the UK, (ii) household 
panel purchase data, and (iii) data on new product introductions. The analyzed brands include 
both large and small brands, both frequent and infrequent advertisers, thus providing a more 
complete and correct overview of the market. The results show that advertising spending patterns 
can be explained as real-life applications of the normative literature, in which advertising and 
advertising goodwill management are embedded in dynamic (s,S) inventory systems. Adstock 
and Ad-sensor show a positive effect on both timing and magnitude decision. Competitive 
reasoning is found to have little to no effect on advertising decisions, whereas category-related 
factors do show an impact. The extent to which campaigning strategies are more or less the 
outcome of advertising goodwill management systems, however, varies across brands as a 
function of their relative size and advertising frequency. 
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  21. Introduction 
Advertising is one of the most important marketing instruments. For example, in 2006, 
US adspend totaled $285.1 billion, representing 2.2% of the country’s GDP. Companies as 
Procter & Gamble and AT&T spend billions of dollars per year on advertising (AdAge, 2007). 
Given its prominent position, it should come as no surprise that advertising, and the way it affects 
people’s decisions, has been the subject of an extensive body of prior research (see e.g. Tellis and 
Ambler 2007 for a recent review). The main focus of these studies was on the quantification of 
advertising’s  effectiveness. Studies explaining observed advertising spending patterns, in 
contrast, have received much less attention. Still, insights into why brands start/stop advertising 
are very relevant to advertising media and advertisers alike. The former will benefit from a 
profound understanding of the purchase behavior of their customers, i.e. the spending patterns of 
advertising brands. Advertisers, in turn, are interested in accurate predictions on the expected 
timing and size of their competitors’ spending in order to gauge the extent of competitive 
interference they may expect (cfr. Danaher et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 1. Weekly advertising for three brands in the UK soft drink and cleanser markets 
 
 
The figures between brackets show  the percentage of weeks with advertising actions and  the average magnitude of these actions 
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  3  As shown in Figure 1, considerable variation exists along both the timing and size 
dimension. The first three panels exhibit the weekly advertising expenditures for three soft-drink 
brands in the UK. Brand A is a frequent and heavy advertiser (100% of the time, average 
spending £347,348 per week), while brand C is situated at the other end of the spectrum. It 
engages only occasionally in advertising actions (42% of the time), and when doing so, spends 
only small amounts (£44,784 on average). Brand B takes an intermediate position: it advertises 
less often than brand A (59% of the time), but spends a larger amount on these sparse actions 
than C (£134,481 on average). The bottom panels of Figure 1 depict three brands in the UK 
cleanser market. Also in that market, considerable variability is observed in both the timing and 
the size dimension. Moreover, the absolute spending level appears to be considerably lower than 
in the soft-drink market. What is driving this over-time variation within a given brand? Why do 
we find such substantial differences across brands? Or across industries? 
 
  Some features of these observed patterns may have emerged as the result of applying the 
guidelines of a series of normative studies which have shown that, in most instances, pulsed 
advertising is an optimal strategy (e.g. Mahajan and Muller, 1986; Mesak, 1992; Park and Hahn, 
1992; Villas-Boas, 1993; Naik et al.,1998). These studies, however, although insightful on the 
optimality of pulsed over even spending, remain vague on some crucial implementation issues, 
including (i) how often to advertise, (ii) how many weeks an advertising pulse or campaign 
should last, and (iii) how much should be spent. Moreover, (iv) they do not provide insights on 
the observed behavioral differences between brands and categories. As such, and differing from 
our study, their objective is not to explain the variation found in observed behavior. Such real 
world behavior, in contrast, was the focus of a body of empirical studies (e.g. Metwally, 1978; 
Jones, 1990; Hanssens, 1980a+b; Chandy et al., 2001; Steenkamp et al., 2005). These studies 
manage to capture and explain very well the behavior under examination, but are weaker in the 
theoretical foundations of their explanations, thus almost being the opposite of the normative 
studies. 
 
  We build on the normative literature, and develop a framework which allows us to 
describe and understand the advertising behavior as observed in the market, and this along two 
dimensions: (i) the timing of advertising actions (i.e. whether or not to advertise), and (ii) the 
  4magnitude of these actions. We subsequently relate observed differential behavior across brands 
to the size of the brands, and the experience they have in advertising. 
 
  We begin with an overview of the relevant literature. We subsequently present our 
conceptual framework, and introduce the core concepts of this study. We describe our 
econometric model, and give some initial insights in our data. We then present our empirical 




2. Relevant Literature 
The current paper can be positioned against two research streams: (i) normative studies on 
optimal advertising behavior, (ii) empirical studies on advertising and its effectiveness. 
 
Normative literature 
  Over the past decades, the preponderance of the prescriptions from normative studies on 
the optimal timing of advertising has shifted from constant advertising schedules (Zielske, 1959; 
Sasieni, 1971; 1989) to pulsing advertising schedules (e.g. Mahajan and Muller, 1986) as more 
and more real-world effects were included in the analyses. For example, Katz (1980) introduced 
learning and forgetting effects, while Mesak (1992) and Naik et al. (1998) added, respectively, 
wear-out effects and quality restoration. Park and Hahn (1992), Villas-Boas (1993) and Dubé et 
al. (2005), in turn, extended the analyses to competitive settings. In most instances, pulsed 
advertising is now considered to be the optimal strategy for firms. Whereas pulsing is used as a 
generic term describing advertising schedules alternating high and low levels of advertising, 
flighting (e.g. Katz, 1980) is more strict in its definition as it refers to alternation between high 
and zero levels of advertising. As such, it is an extreme case of pulsing. Finally, the concept of 
campaigning (Doganoglu and Klapper, 2006) was introduced to describe the fact that advertising 
pulses are often not one-time spikes, but regularly last several weeks. 
Pulsing strategies appear to be frequently applied by managers (Feinberg, 1992). 
Recently, Dubé et al. (2005) found evidence that the observed behavior in the US Frozen Entrée 
category could be explained as a pulsing strategy based on a dynamic competitive game. 
  5Doganoglu and Klapper (2006), covering the German Detergent Market, found similar support 
for the application of the normative guidelines in the real world decisions they studied. Finally, 
such patterns are also widely present in our own dataset (cfr figure 1), in which only 6 of the 748 
included brands advertise permanently, alternating between high and low levels of advertising. 
However, in contrast with their general agreement on the optimality of pulsed advertising 
strategies, these normative studies provide less clarity on a number of issues related to the actual 
implementation of the advocated strategies. Analysis of real world advertising spending patterns 
indeed showed that, although pulsing strategies are often encountered, large differences are 
observed both within and between brands in (i) the actual timing of advertising campaigns, (ii) 
the number of weeks such campaigns last, and (iii) the monetary value of campaigns. Overall, 
very few normative studies go into that level of detail, and three limitations of these studies thus 
appear. First, these studies mainly focus on the timing of advertising actions within campaigns, 
thereby leaving especially decisions on the magnitude of these actions uncovered. Second, they 
provide guidelines for a single brand, thereby ignoring differences in individual brands’ 
advertising preferences as well as factors that may systematically affect advertising decisions 
across different brands and categories. Finally, as a corollary of this single-brand focus, only very 
few studies allow advertising decisions to be correlated with the decisions of other brands (Park 
and Hahn, 1992; Villas-Boas, 1993; Dubé et al., 2005).  
 
Empirical literature 
In a wide series of econometric studies on advertising, measuring the effectiveness of 
advertising  takes a central position. Performance was treated as a function of advertising 
expenditures in so-called single equation models (e.g. Lambin and Palda, 1969; Lambin, Naert 
and Bultez, 1975). These models treated advertising as exogenous, without investigating how 
spending patterns were formed. This exogeneity assumption was relaxed in subsequent 
simultaneous equation models, starting with Bass (1969) and including work by Bass and Parsons 
(1969) and Hanssens (1980a), as in more recent VAR models (Dekimpe and Hanssens, 1995a; 
1999). The latter not only allow for feedback effects (when past own performance helps explain 
current spending), but also competitive interactions. A recent study in this field is Steenkamp et 
al. (2005), who used vector-autoregressive models to study advertising reaction strategies in 442 
packaged goods categories.  
  6A major strength of these studies is that they, in contrast to the normative studies, look 
further than the explanation of the behavior of just one brand, and try to explain patterns across 
brands and categories. However, this body of research shares three important limitations. First of 
all, the theoretical background in these studies is often rather limited. Often, observed patterns are 
explained without a concise and consistent theoretical framework grounded in the normative 
literature. Second, although advertising expenditures are no longer treated as exogenous, no 
distinction is made between the decisions to advertise or not (timing), and how much to spend 
when advertising (magnitude), even though the factors that drive both decisions could (partly) be 
different or have different weights. Finally, most (if not all) of these studies show a bias towards 
large and frequently acting brands. This is due to the fact that most time-series techniques have 
problems with large numbers of zeros and irregular patterns (e.g. in advertising spending), as is 
often the case with smaller brands. Steenkamp et al. (2005), for example, limited themselves to 
those top-3 brands in each category that also had an average share larger than 5%, and that 
advertised at least more than 12% of the time (25 out of 208 weeks). Zanutto and Bradlow (2006) 
showed that such data pruning may bias the overall inferences, as the included brands are only 
representative for a small subset of all brands in the market. Hence, the empirical generalizations 
derived in these studies may only be valid for that specific subset.  
 
Our study 
We build upon the insights of the existing normative literature on optimal advertising 
scheduling by including campaigning in our framework. Two crucial elements in our work are 
the concepts of Adstock and Ad-sensor, capturing the campaigning state dependence of brands 
and their dynamic pulsing behavior, respectively. 
 
The definition of campaigning implies two basic conditions. First of all, campaigns are 
defined as prolonged periods of advertising, alternated by periods without advertising. Once 
advertising has begun, it will be continued for some time. This state dependence will be captured 
by the Adstock concept, a concept which is widely known and used in advertising research (e.g. 
Broadbent, 1984; Hanssens et al., 2001). The probability of a new advertising action will be 
higher if a brand was also advertising in the previous weeks, which has resulted in higher 
Adstock. Conversely, the probability of no new advertising action will be higher if the brand was 
  7not advertising in the previous weeks, during which Adstock was depleting, resulting in a lower 
Adstock level. The second condition holds that, at a certain moment in time, one has to start a 
new campaign, i.e. start advertising. Conversely, at a certain moment in time, a campaign will 
end, and one has to stop advertising. Managers want to keep their Adstock above a certain level.  
As soon as the Adstock, built by previous campaigns, has depreciated to a that level, one will 
start advertising. Similarly, one is likely to stop advertising once a desired (higher) level has been 
reached again. Such advertising reasoning shows close resemblance to so-called (s,S) inventory 
management systems. Such systems keep the stock of a certain item between a minimum level s 
and a maximum level S, by repurchasing if the stock becomes too small, up to the desired 
maximum level. Although very popular and widely used in logistics (e.g. Silver et al., 1998), 
applications in advertising research are rather scarce (Zufryden, 1979; Doganoglu and Klapper, 
2006).  
As such, we build a parsimonious and flexible model which captures in a straightforward 
way how observed advertising spending patterns could result from dynamic advertising 
adjustment strategies. We address weaknesses of previous research by incorporating four main 
challenges in our model specification: (i) we allow for differential processes driving the timing 
and magnitude decisions, (ii) we accommodate heterogeneous preferences and behavior across 
brands, (iii) we examine the effect of moderating variables across brands and categories, and (iv) 
we accommodate correlations between the brands decisions within the same category.  
Our study, in addition, is unique in its empirical scope, covering advertising decisions on 
a weekly basis for 748 brands in 129 CPG categories. We include all brands in these categories 
that advertise in our study, regardless of their advertising intensity (provided that they advertise 
at least once, otherwise the issue becomes moot) and their Brand market share. An illustration of 
the relative importance of this issue can be found in figure 2. This figure depicts the 
consequences of the application of the decisions rules as used in Steenkamp et al. (2005) to our 
dataset. We categorize all brands according to their compliance (Y/N) with the size (top 3, 






  8Figure 2. Application of the Steenkamp et al. (2005) data pruning rules to our dataset 
    
N = 151
Combined share of advertising = 63.9%
Mean market share = 18.4%
Mean combined market share = 32.7%
Mean advertising share in category = 41.2%
Mean number of advertising weeks = 82
N = 229
Combined share of advertising = 33.7%
Mean market share = 2.1%
Mean combined market share = 7.7%
Mean advertising share in category = 11.5%
Mean number of advertising weeks = 57
N = 297
Combined share of advertising = 1.6%
Mean market share = 1.0%
Mean combined market share = 3.2%
Mean advertising share in category = 3.9%  
Mean number of advertising weeks = 6
N = 71
Combined share of advertising = 0.8%
Mean market share = 17.7%
Mean combined market share = 20.3%
Mean advertising share in category = 40.6%
Mean number of advertising weeks = 7
Advertising Frequency > 12% Advertising Frequency ≤ 12%
Top 3 
AND
Market share > 5%
Not Top 3 
OR
Market share ≤ 5%
 
 
  For each block we report the Number of brands (N); their Combined share of advertising 
in our dataset; Mean market share; Mean combined market share; Mean advertising share in their 
category; and the Mean number of advertising weeks. If we only include the brands in our 
empirical dataset that fulfill both requirements, we would cover only 63.9% of all advertising 
expenditures. Brands would have an average market share of 18.4%, and an advertising share of 
41.2%, advertising on average 82 out of 156 weeks. However, these brands, on average, account 
for only 32.7% of the total market, covering, on average, between 0.6% and 99% of category 
advertising expenditures as included in our dataset. Limiting the number of included brands 
would clearly lead to the omission of a major part of the observed advertising actions and 
expenditures from our analyses. Relaxing the aforementioned requirements hence appears 
recommended. Relaxing the size limitation, would enable us to cover over 98% of all advertising 
expenditures. In addition, although infrequent advertisers represent only a very small percentage 
of advertising expenditures, they still account for almost 50% of the advertising brands, and 
nearly 10% of all advertising actions. Understanding how their behavior may differ from more 
frequently acting brands is consequently warranted if we want to understand advertising as we 
observe it in the market. The unique dataset we thus obtain, allows us to formulate a set of 





  93. Drivers of Advertising Investment Decisions 
Advertising decisions can be seen as a multiple decision process. Two key decisions 
which have to be taken, are when to advertise, and how much to spend (Tellis, 2004 p 72; 
Danaher, 2007 p 645; Danaher et al., 2008). This dual advertising decision is treated as an 
investment decision process, which is in line with the growing stream of literature claiming that 
marketing expenditures are more and more considered to be investments (Srivastava et al., 1999).  
At each point in time, the brand therefore chooses (i) whether or not to advertise (timing), and, 




Central to our model are the concepts of Adstock and Ad-sensor, which in itself is also 
derived from Adstock. These concepts capture two crucial aspects of advertising investments. 
The tendency to concentrate advertising investments in longer pulses or campaigns, as we will 
show, is captured by our Adstock variable (Broadbent (1984). Ad-sensor is subsequently 
introduced as a feedback variable mimicking the brand’s decision rule to start and stop 
advertising campaigns. This basic advertising investment decision process is depicted in figure 3. 
 









•A d s t o c k




The Adstock concept was originally developed to assess the dynamic effects of 
advertising. It rests on the assumption that advertising helps to build a stock of advertising 
goodwill (Broadbent, 1984). In the absence of further advertising spending, however, this 
Adstock decays at a constant rate (see e.g. Dekimpe and Hanssens, 2007). In the past, it has been 
  10used in studies on e.g. advertising awareness (Brown, 1986), television advertising effectiveness 
(Tellis and Weiss, 1995), television scheduling (Broadbent et al., 1997; Ephron and McDonald, 
2002), trial of new products (Steenkamp and Gielens, 2003), product-harm crises (Cleeren et al., 
2007) and competitive advertising interference (Danaher et al., 2008). In line with these studies, 
we follow the definition by Broadbent (1984) and operationalize Adstock of brand b as: 
(1)   1 , , , ) 1 ( − + − = t b b t b b t b Adstock g Advertisin Adstock λ λ   
  
  Advertising is often scheduled in campaigns of several consecutive weeks, followed by 
zero advertising during a number of weeks. The likelihood of a brand advertising in week t will 
consequently be higher when it was also advertising in the weeks before. During this period, 
Adstock will be built by means of advertising actions. So, a brand which is in a campaign keeps 
advertising when its Adstock is at relatively high levels. Conversely, the likelihood of a brand not 
advertising in week t will be lower when it was not advertising in the previous weeks. During 
such periods, Adstock will be considerably lower as it decays when no new advertising 
investments are made. We therefore expect a positive effect of Adstock on the likelihood of a 
new advertising action in week t.  
  Conditional upon their decision to advertise, brands still have to determine the amount 
they will spend on their action. As decision making processes are often characterized by a strong 
preference for the status quo (e.g. Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988), previous behavior is a 
particularly good predictor of new actions (e.g. Srinivasan et al., 2007). Higher advertising levels 
during the previous weeks of a campaign are therefore likely to be followed by higher levels in a 
subsequent action, provided that the brand chooses to advertise. Higher previous advertising 
expenditures during a campaign, in turn, are reflected in relatively higher Adstock levels, 
whereas lower advertising levels will have resulted in relatively lower Adstock levels. We 
therefore can expect that brands, conditional on the decision to advertise, will spend more on 
such new actions when their Adstock level is higher.  
  Together, these two effects, both in timing and magnitude of advertising actions, show 




  11Ad-sensor 
Although Adstock provides a better understanding of the campaigning state dependencies, 
it is less insightful on why brands would start or stop an advertising campaign. What triggers the 
launch of new campaigns? Why and when do they end? Answers to these questions can be found 
by analyzing the goals of advertising investments. By means of advertising, brands build 
advertising goodwill among consumers. This goodwill is expected to translate into sales, and 
should consequently not fall below a certain level. If this, however, would be the case, new 
advertising investments become necessary to preserve and strengthen sales. At that moment, a 
new campaign will be launched. The ultimate goal of any brand would be to achieve unlimited 
goodwill. However, advertising budgets are not unlimited. We therefore assume that a specific 
target level of goodwill will be determined for each campaign, the level of which is unknowng to 
us. In the beginning of a campaign, when goodwill build-up has just started, incentives to stop 
will be rather small. The closer to that target level, however, the lower will be the need to 
continue investing. In addition, once it has been reached, there is a clear incentive to stop 
investing. The pressure a brand feels to start a campaign as soon as its goodwill among 
consumers becomes too low, and to stop that same campaign when the desired (higher) goodwill 
level is reached, is the essence of our Ad-sensor concept. 
We define our Ad-sensor by integrating the Adstock concept in an (s,S) stock 
replenishment system. As such, s represents the minimum Adstock level a brand wants to 
maintain, whereas S is the (higher) target level. The implicit goal of such (s,S) systems is hence 
to maintain the stock between the two levels. These levels are known to the brand manager, but 
unknown to the researcher. In addition, managers can apply dynamic strategies in their choice of 
these minimum and maximum levels, thus allowing for different levels in different campaigns. 
We therefore consider the observed minimum and maximum levels as the actual outcomes of 
managers’ utility maximization calculi.   
To model this (s,S) behavior, we first consider what happens when the Adstock of brand b 
falls below the minimum desired level. At that moment, the brand should start advertising again. 
The brand will launch a new campaign, and will continue to invest in advertising until the target 
is reached. At that maximum, the first derivative of Adstock to time is zero, at least in continuous 
time. Since we are using discrete time observations, however, at time t the researcher can only 
observe up to time t-1, so the first order condition is equivalent to: 





Adstock t b .           
this becomes: 
(4)   0




Adstock Adstock t b t b  
(5)     0 2 , 1 , = − ⇔ − − t b t b Adstock Adstock . 
Given our additive Adstock function, this is satisfied if: 
(6)   0 ) 1 ( 2 , 2 , 1 , = − + − − − − t b t b b t b b Adstock Adstock Advert λ λ  
(7)     2 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − = − ⇔ t b b t b b Adstock Advert λ λ  
(8)     2 , 1 , − − = ⇔ t b t b Adstock Advert   
The second-order condition for a maximum requires that in the period before the maximum, t-1, 
Adstock is still increasing, which requires that  . Based on these 
observations, we define our Ad-sensor variable as the difference between Adstock in time t-1 and 
Adstock in t-2: 
3 , 2 , − − > t b t b Adstock Advert
(9)   2 , 1 , , − − − = t b t b t b Adstock Adstock Adsensor  
The full mathematical derivation of Ad-sensor is given in appendix A. As such, the Ad-sensor 
allows us to capture the evolution of a brand’s Adstock, and the associated pressure to advertise. 
During the build-up of Adstock, Ad-sensor will have positive values. Over time, as Adstock 
increases, these values start to decrease. Once the target maximum Adstock level S was reached, 
Adstock becomes negative, a clear incentive to stop advertising. Over time, Adstock depletes, 
and Ad-sensor increases again, implying an increasing pressure for the brand to advertise again.   
To provide better insights in the functioning of this system, we simulate a series of 
advertising actions. In our simulation, we impose values on the carry-over parameter λ, which is 
used to calculate Adstock and consequently Ad-sensor, and the minimum and maximum Adstock 
levels s and S. In practice, however, we estimate all parameters based on the observed advertising 
patterns. The numerical build-up of this example is included in appendix B. The evolution of the 
associated Ad-sensor is represented in figure 4. The solid grey line represents the advertising 
expenditures, the dotted black line the created Adstock and the solid black line the Ad-sensor. As 
indicated by equation 9, the latter represents the recent change in Adstock due to advertising 
investments.  
  13Figure 4. Advertising, Adstock and Ad-sensor 
 
 
In week 4, the brand launches a new campaign, as Adstock has fallen below the allowed 
minimum level s. As a corollary of our Adstock definition, Adstock will increase as long as the 
advertising investments are larger than the previous Adstock level (see appendix A). The first 
investments start building Adstock, but at the same time as well increase the pressure not to stop 
the campaign prematurely (captured by the Ad-sensor), as the desired level S is still far away. By 
period 6, the Adstock level is increasingly approaching the advertising level, and increases in 
Adstock start becoming smaller. Gradually, the brand is approaching the target Adstock level S. 
This is also reflected in the Ad-sensor, which slowly starts to decay from period 7 on. Stopping 
becomes less harmful, as the target level is getting closer. In week 10, the maximum (desired) 
Adstock level has been reached. By week 11, Ad-stock starts to decay. Ad-sensor, in turn, 
becomes strongly negative in the next period: the target of the campaign was attained, continued 
investments make little sense. However, still some smaller amounts of advertising are typically 
found at the end of advertising campaigns. These are often due to so-called make-goods (see e.g. 
Doganoglu and Klapper, 2006), smaller actions often added at the end of campaigns in order to 
compensate for lost opportunities during the campaign itself. Over time, Adstock depletes at a 
constant rate λ (see equation 1), but not in constant absolute terms. When Adstock levels are still 
high, depletion will be large in absolute terms, causing strong negative Ad-sensor values. Over 
time, the Adstock level becomes smaller, and depletion will be smaller in absolute terms. This 
results in a gradual increase of the Ad-sensor.  
In sum: the Ad-sensor variable is essentially a feedback variable mimicking the brand's 
decision rule to start and stop advertising. We thus expect a positive effect of the Ad-sensor on 
the timing decision (yes or no). In addition, a similar effect is hypothesized for the magnitude 
decision (given timing). A wider gap between the actual and the target Adstock level requires 
  14stronger efforts to rapidly bridge this gap. As the brand gets closer to the target level, however, 
this pressure becomes smaller, as the gap has become much smaller. Beyond the point in time 
during which the target level was reached, the relevance of continued spending can be 
questioned. The Ad-sensor tells brand that, if they still would be spending on advertising actions, 
it should at least be small amounts. 
 
Moderating factors of Adstock and Ad-sensor 
The combination of Adstock and Ad-sensor creates a new model for the analysis of 
advertising decisions. A subsequent investigation of the general applicability of this model across 
a large set of brands is hence asked for. However, the extent to which Adstock is managed 
between s and S may differ across brands. In this paper, we focus on two important brand 
characteristics: Brand market share and Advertising frequency. The motivation for this choice is 
threefold. First of all, both factors have commonly been used in the past as a basis for data 
selection rules (e.g. Steenkamp et al., 2005). Brands typically included in previous studies on the 
basis of such selection rules, however, are not representative for the market as a whole 
(Slotegraaf and Pauwels, 2008), and inferences based on these subsets could be biased (Zanutto 
and Bradlow, 2006).  As we include all types of brands, understanding to what extent behavior 
may differ for types of brands which were previously excluded from analyses is essential, and 
can in addition provide insights on the extent to which data pruning rules could have altered our 
findings. In addition, two other motivations explain our choice. Brand market share has emerged 
from previous research as a key characteristic in advertising decisions (e.g. Patti and Blasko, 
1981; Lynch and Hooley, 1990). Advertising decision making and its outcome will depend on the 
market share a brand has and wants to maintain. Advertising frequency, in turn, may create 
learning effects. An examination of the effect of advertising frequency consequently helps us to 
understand if, and to what extent, more experienced brands have gained a relative advantage over 
time in managing their Adstock. 
Larger brands have more means at their disposal, and marketing budgets, moreover, are 
often determined on a percentage of sales basis (Allenby and Hanssens, 2005). This will affect 
the advertising decision process in two ways. These brands can reserve larger budgets for 
marketing research compared to their smaller counterparts. They thus can be expected to be better 
informed on how their advertising goodwill level is evolving, and can consequently better react 
  15to it. We therefore expect a positive effect of Brand market share on the effect of Ad-sensor in 
both decisions. In addition, their larger budgets allow them to pursue longer and more intense 
advertising campaigns. The state dependence effect as implied by the Adstock will consequently 
be higher for such brands. 
Experience enables brands to adapt their organizations and processes in order to perform 
optimally. The advertising decision process is no exception to this. More experienced brands 
have become more efficient through learning effects and have established effective advertising 
decision processes. On the organizational level, these decision processes tend to stay very similar 
over time (Frederickson and Iaquinto, 1989), as organizations have to be reliable, accountable 
and reproducible (Boeker, 1988). What has proven to be effective, will be continued. A 
consistent closer monitoring of the advertising goodwill evolution as well as reactance to it can 
consequently be expected. We therefore expect the effect of Ad-sensor to be positively affected 
by Advertising frequency. This experience, built by more intense advertising strategies in the 
past, moreover, will as well enable brands to better pursue longer and more intense advertising 




However, it is unlikely that advertising decisions are only influenced by brands’ own 
internal advertising reasoning. Three main sets of factors are commonly considered: (i) Company 
factors, (ii) Competitive factors, and (iii) Category or marketplace factors (Montgomery et al., 
2005).  
First of all, brands will look at themselves. As advertising theory tells that New product 
introductions should be combined with more intense advertising campaigns (e.g. Rossiter and 
Percy, 1997; Kotler and Armstrong, 2004), especially because advertising has shown to be more 
effective for new products (Lodish et al., 1995), we can expect a positive effect of such 
introductions on the advertising decisions, resulting in a higher likelihood of advertising and 
higher actual expenditures. Overall, however, advertising budgets are often set on a yearly basis 
(e.g. Farris and West, 2007). In the course of the year, these budgets get depleted, most often 
faster than expected, sometimes slower, creating relative shortage or slack resources by the end 
of the year respectively. Given the common knowledge that having money leads to spending it, 
  16we expect brands to spend their budgets relatively faster in the beginning of the year. This leaves 
them with relatively fewer means at the end, and thus a negative impact of an End of year dummy 
on the advertising decisions, resulting in fewer and smaller advertising actions, is hypothesized. 
Next to themselves, brands will monitor their competitors and their own performance 
relative to the latter. Competitive adstock captures the likelihood of competitive advertising 
campaigns. The effect of this factor on the decision outcome is not clear a priori, as arguments in 
both directions can be found, with brands clearly reacting on each other (e.g. Metwally, 1978; 
Chen and MacMillan, 1992), or trying to avoid competitive clutter (Danaher et al., 2008). In 
addition, brands frequently make decisions in order to perform well relative to their competitors, 
on e.g. market share (e.g. Metwally, 1978; Armstrong and Collopy, 1996). However, as budgets 
are often set as a percentage of past sales (see e.g. Allenby and Hanssens, 2005), a negative 
Relative performance evolution versus competitors as expressed by a decrease in market share 
may at the same time create a stronger urge to react and lower the ability to react. Here as well, 
the effect on the advertising decisions is not clear a priori. 
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Finally, brands are looking at the markets they are operating in. High Category growth 
not only engenders larger current profits and hence marketing budgets, it can also be regarded as 
an indicator of potential future profits, leading companies to defend their positions in such 
categories even more fiercely (Gatignon et al., 1990). At the same time, however, if category 
growth is near zero, competitive actions can become a zero-sum game. Hence, such categories 
  17can be characterized by intense competition, also with advertising, to protect sales volumes 
(Aaker and Day, 1986). Given the well-known detrimental impact of such strategies on the 
profits of the brands, we hypothesize that the indicator-of-future-profit effect will be stronger 
than the zero-sum effect, leading to a positive effect of category growth on the advertising 
decisions. Categories with higher Category concentration are more open to collusive behavior, 
leading to lower competitive interactions (e.g. Steenkamp et al., 2005), and thus likely as well to 
lower advertising spending. We therefore expect to find a negative effect of concentration on the 
advertising decisions. 
The conceptual framework presented here is summarized in figure 5. We investigate the 
ability of Adstock and Ad-sensor to explain advertising decisions, test the influence of 
moderating factors Brand market share and Advertising frequency, while controlling for an 
extensive set of other variables. We relate our results further to the literature when reporting our 
empirical findings.  
 
 
4. Model Development  
Our conceptual framework implies four modeling requirements. First, we need to model 
both the timing (yes/no) and spending decisions (monetary value), while allowing for different 
response parameters for both decisions
1. Second, these response parameters are allowed to vary 
across brands. Third, we need to accommodate the effects of the moderating variables, preferably 
in a simultaneous estimation step for maximal statistical efficiency. Fourth, the decisions of when 
and how much to spend may be interrelated between brands within a category, and hence we 
need to specify a full error covariance structure. 
To meet these requirements we link the drivers to the two decision variables (i.e. timing 
and magnitude) through a new multivariate Hierarchical Tobit-II model, which extends the 
models of Fox et al. (2004) and Van Heerde et al. (2008) as these models do not comply with all 
                                                 
1 A similar framework, investigating timing and magnitude of capital stock investments, was introduced by Bar-Ilan 
and Strange (1999). The authors allowed the company to decide on both when and how much to invest, thereby 
going beyond existing literature that focused on either timing or intensity of investments. Bowman, Farley and 
Schmittlein (2000) extended this reasoning to the choice and level of use of international service providers. 
Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary (2000), in turn, introduced a similar dual but also more sequential reasoning to 
international new product adoption processes. Finally, Gielens and Dekimpe (2007) applied a resembling framework 
to the entry strategy of retail firms into transition economies. 
  18four requirements
2. In the subsequent exposition, c refers to category (c=1,…,C) and b to brand 
(b=1,…,BB




An advertising decision in category c by brand b in week t ( ) is described by a 
multivariate probit model: 
cbt z












Previous work suggests analyzing the decisions at a weekly level. In general, less data 
aggregation provides more accurate results (Tellis and Franses, 2006). In addition, the managerial 
survey reported by Steenkamp et al. (2005) indicated that brands can react to events as fast as 
within one week, but generally not faster.  
The latent variable , describing the timing decision process of the brand, is modeled 
through a linear model: 
*
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In equation (11) we first include a set of time-varying variables, i.e. Adstock and Ad-sensor and 
the covariates Competitive adstock, Relative performance evolution, New product introduction, 
End of year budget depletion, Category growth and Category concentration. In addition, we 
control for holidays, seasonality, and possible trending behavior. As advertising decisions for 
time t will be based on information available up to time t-1, we include 1 period lagged versions 
of most time-varying explanatory variables.  
 
Amount spent 
Conditional on the decision to advertise (  = 1), we model  , the natural logarithm 
of the amount spent on advertising by brand b in category c during week t as: 
cbt z cbt y
 
2 These models do not allow for effects of moderating variables on the response parameters. In addition, in the work 
of Fox et al. (2004) no full error covariance structure is specified across the two equations; error covariance 
structures are separated for incidence and timing. 
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We include the same explanatory variables in the magnitude equation as in the timing equation. 
Although there is no specific requirement to have the same set in both equations, we include 
them in an exploratory way to investigate whether all factors have an effect in both decisions. 
 
Moderating factors 
  In their specific baseline advertising preferences (the intercepts) and their reactions to 
their Adstock and Ad-sensor, brands may be guided by a number of own-company, and category 
factors, as these may shape both the ability and the necessity to react. We therefore relate a subset 
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The included moderator variables are time-invariant and allow us to measure the cross-sectional 
variance in baseline advertising preferences as expressed by the intercept included in (11)-(12). 
The categories included in our sample, can be categorized under four main product classes, i.e. 
Household Products, Food, Drinks and Cosmetics. We control for the preferences of these four 
product classes, using Household Products as reference category. In addition, we investigate the 
possible moderating effect Brand market share and Advertising frequency can have on both the 
baseline advertising preferences and the impact of Adstock and Ad-sensor on the advertising 
decisions. Mean-centering of both variables allows us to examine the effects of deviations 
relative to an ‘average’ brand. The effects of the covariates, captured by   and   (for i = 
cb
i , 1 ζ
cb
i , 1 ω
  203…8), are related to the hyperparameters  0 , , 1 i ζ  and  0 , , 1 i ω , and the brand-specific error terms   
and  . 
cb
i u , 1
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  Decisions by one brand on when and how much to advertise are likely to impact those of 
other brands. We therefore assume that the error vectors  )' , , ( 1 t cB t c ct c μ μ K = μ and 
)' , , ( 1 t cB t c ct c ε ε K = ε  follow a joint multivariate normal distribution, with a full variance-
covariance matrix:  ~) . Finally, unobserved drivers of model parameters may 
cause the error terms in (13) up to (16) to be correlated as well:  ~ . 
)' , (
' '
ct ct μ ε , 0 ( c MVN Σ
)' , (
' '
cb cb u e ) , 0 ( Ω MVN
  We estimate model (11)-(16) with Bayesian techniques, i.e., Gibbs sampling. The benefit 
of this approach over classical approaches is that it, at the same time, (i) accommodates the 
multivariate nature of our dependent variable, (ii) allows for full variance-covariance between all 
decisions by brands within the same category, and (iii) estimates the moderator effects 
simultaneously with the other parameters rather than in a two-step approach. An overview of this 
procedure is given in appendix C. 
 
  To operationalize the Adstock and Ad-sensor variables, we need to know the brand-
specific carry-over parameter b λ (see equation 2). To estimate these carry-over parameters, we use 
the following traditional partial adjustment model (Hanssens et al., 2001 p147): 
(17)         t b t b b t b b b t b Sales Adv Sales , 1 , , , ln ε λ β α + + + = −




5. Data description 
We estimate our model on 129 CPG categories in the UK.  These categories cover nearly 
completely the assortment offered in a typical supermarket. An overview of the included product 
categories, along with the range of included brands, is given in table 1. 
 
 
  21Table 1. Overview of included product types 
Product Fields  Examples  No. of Categories  Range of Brands 
      
Assorted Foods  Breakfast cereals, dry pasta, flour  23  1-11 
Beverages  Brandy, mineral waters, softdrinks  20  1-27 
Cakes  Oatcakes, crumpets pickelets and muffins  4  1-9 
Candy  Cereal bars, countline chocolate, fruit bars  7  1-15 
Canned/bottled foods  Canned fish, canned fruit  8  1-9 
Care products  Deodorants, shampoo, toilet tissue  22  1-27 
Cleaning products  Descalers, scouring powders, drain care  14  1-14 
Dairy products  Butter, cream, yoghurt  7  1-11 
Frozen foods  Frozen fish, frozen vegetables  4  2-6 
Household supplies  Batteries, car freshener  3  1-9 
Pet products  Dog food, cat litter  3  2-21 
Taste enhancers  Mustard, vinegar, Worcester sauce  14  1-30 
Total   129  748 
 
 
Four years of weekly advertising spending data were obtained from NielsenMedia, from 
which we use one year (52 weeks) as initialization period, and three years (156 weeks) as 
estimation period.  All brands that (i) advertised at least once during the estimation period, and 
(ii) were present in the market during the whole estimation period, were included.  As such, both 
small and large brands were considered, as reflected in the range of their average (across the three 
years estimation period) market-shares, which varied from a low of 0.0002% to a high of 
97.76%.  We focused on national brands, as private labels have a very different positioning and 
advertising strategy (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007).  Still, private labels were considered in the 
derivation of certain covariates, as the concentration level in the industry or the national brands’ 
market shares.  These decision rules resulted in a sample of 748 brands.  Even though the focus 
of the current paper is to study the spending pattern of brands that advertise, it is interesting to 
note that 1855 brands never advertised during the considered three years, even though they were 
in the market for the entire period.   
 
Among the 748 brands that did advertise at least once, considerable variability exists in 
their advertising behavior, as was already indicated in figure 2. First, the number of advertised 
weeks varies greatly. About one out of ten brands advertised only once, while a few brands (6 in 
total) advertised every week. However, the distribution is quite skewed, as nearly half of the 
brands advertised less than 10% of the time (see figure 6).  
  22Figure 6. Advertising weeks. 
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Table 2 also provides evidence for the large variability in actual spending, even when 
conditioning on those weeks where a given brand advertises.  Some brands typically spend large 
amounts (with an average level of £814,536 per week), while others spend only a limited amount 
per week (£19).   
 
Table 2. Advertising behavior of the Included Brands 
 Range  Average  Standard  deviation 
      
Number of Advertising Weeks  1-156  37  42 
Average Spending per Advertising Week (in £)  19-814,536  56,756  72,150 
 
Combining both dimensions (using a median split on, respectively, the number of weeks 
of non-zero spending and the average value of such non-zero spending), we observe two main 
types of advertisers in Figure 7: Heavy advertisers, who spend large amounts per week for 
multiple weeks; and Light advertisers, limiting themselves to fewer actions and smaller amounts.   
Even though the heavy advertisers in the top-left cell only account for 39.57% of the brands, they 
represent 96.15% of the total advertising over the 3-year estimation period. Of these 296 brands, 
only 140 would comply with the Steenkamp et al. (2005) decision rules. These 140 brands 
account for 63.76% of all advertising expenditures. The remaining 11 of the 151 brands which 
would comply with these rules would account for only 0.16%. Limiting ourselves to these 151 
brands would hence result in a loss of information on more than 1/3 of all advertising 
expenditures by branded products, in which especially the focus on large brands appears to have 
  23strong consequences for the amount of advertising that is covered by the analyses. However, even 
though infrequent advertisers account for only a small part of total advertising expenditures, they 
still represent a large number of players, and hence in total as well a large number of advertising 
actions. By including them as well in our analyses, we can provide a better understanding of 
advertising in the market as a whole, thereby also providing evidence on how behavior may differ 
for smaller vs larger and more vs less frequently acting brands. 
 
Figure 7. Brands in dataset classified by Number of Advertising Weeks vs Average Spending per Advertising Week, Based 









Numbers between brackets show the number of brands which comply with the Steenkamp et al. (2005) decision rules. 
 
As a second main data source, we had access (through TNS) to consumer panel purchase 
data covering all purchases for over 17,000 families. These were used to calculate (i) the market 
shares of the different players, (ii) the category concentration and, (iii) the extent of category 
growth. Finally data on new product introductions (see e.g. Sorescu and Spanjol, 2008) were 
obtained through ProductScan
©.    
 
Measurement 
We now turn to the measurement of the different constructs. In section 4, we already 
provided an in-depth discussion of the Adstock and Ad-sensor  concepts. The brand-specific 
lambdas were obtained by a Bayesian regression estimation of a partial adjustment sales model 
(Hanssens et al., 2001 p. 147), thereby allowing for correlations between brands’ sales within the 
same category. An overview of the procedure can be found in appendix D. To account for the 
uncertainty in the estimated lambdas, we use each of the 60,000 draws of the lambdas obtained 
  24after burn-in of 30,000 draws to calculate brand-specific Adstock and Ad-sensor series. These 
60,000 series are subsequently used in the actual model estimation, with a burn in of 30,000 and 
sample of 30,000 draws for inference.  
Advertising frequency equals the percentage of time the brand was advertised during the 
52-week initialization period. In the choice of the data range to determine this factor, the aim is to 
match as closely as possible the estimation sample. However, as we analyze advertising 
decisions, Advertising frequency could suffer from endogeneity problems when estimated on the 
156-week estimation period. This made us opt to determine the factor based on the 52-week 
initialization period. These endogeneity problems, however, are not as severe for Brand market 
share, which is consequently defined as the average market share over the 156-week estimation 
period. 
The first four weeks a new product is on the market, New product introduction will equal 
1; the other weeks 0. Similarly, the last four weeks of the year, the End of year budget depletion 
dummy variable will equal 1; the other weeks 0. Competitive adstock is defined as the weighted 
average of the competitors’ Adstock values. The weights are dynamic, and based on the market 
share in volume terms over the previous 26 weeks (see e.g. Nijs et al., 2001; 2007). Relative 
performance evolution is expressed by the first difference of the logarithm of the brand volume 
shares (see e.g. Deleersnyder et al. 2004), also defined over a moving window of the previous 26 
weeks.  Category growth is measured as the first difference of the log-transformed category 
volume sales (cfr Franses and Koop, 1998).  Finally, the Herfindahl index of volume shares over 
the previous 26 weeks period is used to quantify the Category concentration. All 
operationalizations are summarized in appendix E. 
 
 
6. Empirical analysis   
  The coefficient estimates are shown in tables 3 and 4. They show the 95% posterior 
density intervals for the estimates, the latter printed in bold if zero is not included in the interval.  
Adstock Management 
Adstock.  Table 3  shows the expected positive effect of Adstock on the likelihood of 
advertising actions ( 0 , 1 , 1 ζ = 0.241). The conclusions of the stream of normative literature that 
advertising in most instances can best be scheduled in pulses or campaigns, appear to be adopted 
  25by the market. Brands show a clear state dependency, with periods of advertising during which 
the Adstock is rebuilt followed by periods during which it is allowed to deplete again. This state 
dependency, moreover, is also shown by the positive effect of Adstock on the magnitude of 
advertising actions ( 0 , 1 , 1 ω = 0.011). More intense actions during the previous weeks of an 
advertising campaign, resulting in higher Adstock levels, will be followed by higher spending in 
subsequent actions, implying that brands either opt for consistently high or low intensity 
campaigns. 
 
Table 3. Adstock Management: parameter estimates 














             
Adstock  0 , 1 , 1 ζ   0.198  0.241  0.289  0 , 1 , 1 ω   0.006  0.011  0.017 
x Brand market share  1 , 1 , 1 ζ   0.512  1.009  1.529  1 , 1 , 1 ω   -0.028 0.004  0.035 
x Advertising frequency  2 , 1 , 1 ζ   0.638  0.781  0.933  2 , 1 , 1 ω   0.028  0.041  0.052 
             
Ad-sensor  0 , 2 , 1 ζ   0.107  0.130  0.150  0 , 2 , 1 ω   0.066  0245  0.454 
x Brand market share  1 , 2 , 1 ζ   0.417  0.663  0.915  1 , 2 , 1 ω   -0.002 0.019  0.041 
x Advertising frequency  2 , 2 , 1 ζ   0.131  0.208  0.295  2 , 2 , 1 ω   0.009  0.017  0.025 
             
Brand market share  1 , 0 , 1 ζ   -0.089 0.822 2.325  1 , 0 , 1 ω   0.066  0.245  0.454 
Advertising frequency  2 , 0 , 1 ζ   4.735  5.192  5.586  2 , 0 , 1 ω   0.512  0.592  0.670 
             
 
 
Ad-sensor shows a significant positive effect in the starting and stopping of advertising 
campaigns ( 0 , 2 , 1 ζ = 0.130). When the Ad-sensor values become too high, a brand will start 
advertising. The closer to the desired maximum goodwill level in the campaign, the more likely 
the brand will stop advertising. Once the target has been reached, negative values of the Ad-
sensor will increase the pressure to stop advertising even further. Over time, however, the 
pressure to start a new campaign will start building again. Moreover, as long as one is still far 
away from the goal level of Adstock for that specific campaign, i.e. when the Ad-sensor has 
  26relatively higher levels, it will also remain a source of pressure to spend more in order to reach 
the desired level faster ( 0 , 2 , 1 ω = 0.006). Once the desired target has been reached, it gives clear 
indications to no longer spend large amounts in case the brand would still decide to advertise. 
This also captures quite well the phenomenon of make goods: the target level was reached, but 
still some smaller remaining advertising can still be found at the end of the campaign. 
The effects of Adstock and Ad-sensor for our numerical example, as well as their 
combined effect, are represented in figure 8. This is an illustration for an ‘average’ brand, with  
zero-effects of the mean-centered moderators. The first panel of figure 8 shows the effects on the 
timing decision, in which the period during which advertising is taking place is indicated by the 
grey zone. The second panel subsequently shows the effects on the magnitude decision 
 
Figure 8. Effects of Adstock and Ad-sensor on Timing and Magnitude decision for our example 
 
 
Moderators of Adstock and Ad-sensor 
Brand market share. The larger brands in our set are likely to spend more on individual 
advertising actions ( 1 , 0 , 1 ω = 0.245). As marketing budgets are often set as a percentage of sales of 
previous periods (e.g. Allenby and Hanssens, 2005), more powerful brands will have larger 
budgets at their disposal, leading to more intense behavior. These brands, however, do not show 
differential baseline preferences in relation to their timing decisions. 
Larger brands are better able to respond to their internal advertising pressure relative to 
smaller brands. Our results show that this is certainly the case in the timing decision ( 1 , 1 , 1 ζ = 
1.009,  1 , 2 , 1 ζ = 0.663). However, in the magnitude decision, no significant effects could be found. 
 
  27Advertising frequency. Brands advertising more frequently in the past will continue to do 
so ( 2 , 0 , 1 ζ = 5.192). This is in line with previous research showing that current brand actions are 
often strongly influenced by previous behavior due to inertia effects (e.g. Frederickson and 
Iaquinto, 1989; Nijs et al., 2007). In addition, these brands will also spend more when advertising 
( 2 , 0 , 1 ω = 0.592), confirming that basically two types of advertisers can be found: high-intensity 
(advertising often, spending more per decision) and low-intensity (advertising less often, 
spending less on single actions), as was already argued in the data section. 
Our findings confirm the hypotheses that the effects of both Adstock and Ad-sensor are 
stronger for more experienced brands, and this for both the timing and magnitude decisions 
( 2 , 1 , 1 ζ = 0.781 and  2 , 1 , 1 ω = 0.041, respectively;  2 , 2 , 1 ζ = 0.663 and  2 , 2 , 1 ω = 0.017, respectively).  
 
The resulting effects for both Adstock and Ad-sensor are depicted in figures 9 and 10. 
Figures are based on low (10) vs high (50) Adstock and low (-5) vs high (10) Ad-sensor values. 
The graphs in figure 9 show the effect of Adstock and Ad-sensor in the Timing decision for low 
vs high values of Brand market share and Advertising frequency. The graphs in figure 10 show 
the effects for the Magnitude decision. Moderating effects are reasonably strong for the Adstock 
effect. Larger and more experienced brands show much stronger campaigning behavior (panels 
9a and 9c). They have more and better means and capabilities to pursue longer campaigns. More 
experienced brands will also be more likely adopters of consistently high or low advertising 
campaigns, as they as well show higher state dependence in their spending decision (panel 10c). 
Similarly, larger and more experienced brands can better track their Ad-sensor, and will more 
strongly react to its evolution in their decision on whether or not to start/stop a campaign (panels 
9b and 9d). In the beginning of a campaign, Ad-sensor is high. Combined with a strong response 
coefficient for more experienced brands, this will cause a faster and stronger build-up at the 
beginning. The combination of a strong response coefficient and negative Ad-sensor values after 
the target level was reached, in turn, will result in a strong tendency of more experienced brands 
to refrain from investing relatively large amounts after the target level was attained (panel 10d).  
 
 
Figure 9. Effect of Adstock and Ad-sensor on timing decision as a function of Brand market share and Advertising 
frequency 
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Impact of baseline advertising preference drivers and covariates 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates of time-invariant baseline advertising preference 
drivers and the set of time-varying covariates we included in our analysis. We do not discuss the 
effects of Brand market share and Advertising frequency as they were already reported above, but 
  29include them for reasons of completeness. For similar reasons, we also report the effects of the 
product class variables which were added to the model as control variables.   
 
Table 4. Baseline advertising drivers and covariates: parameter estimates 
















           
Brand market share  1 , 0 , 1 ζ   -0.089 0.822 2.325  1 , 0 , 1 ω   0.066  0.245  0.454 
Advertising frequency  2 , 0 , 1 ζ   4.735  5.192  5.586  2 , 0 , 1 ω   0.512  0.592  0.670 
Food  3 , 0 , 1 ζ   -0.641  -0.319  -0.022  3 , 0 , 1 ω   -0.073 -0.016 0.042 
Drinks  4 , 0 , 1 ζ   -0.028 0.273 0.587  4 , 0 , 1 ω   -0.069 -0.020 0.026 
Cosmetics  5 , 0 , 1 ζ   -0.081 0.319 0.666  5 , 0 , 1 ω   0.005  0.062  0.121 
           
Competitive Adstock  0 , 3 , 1 ζ   -0.033 -0.011 0.016  0 , 3 , 1 ω   -0.006 -0.002 0.002 
Relative Performance Evolution  0 , 4 , 1 ζ   -0.152 -0.066 0.075  0 , 4 , 1 ω   -0.050 -0.005 0.026 
New Product Introduction  0 , 5 , 1 ζ   -0.138 0.412 0.807  0 , 5 , 1 ω   -0.013 0.039 0.082 
End of Year Remaining Budget  0 , 6 , 1 ζ   -0.324  -0.252  -0.177  0 , 6 , 1 ω   -0.030  -0.017  -0.008 
Category Growth  0 , 7 , 1 ζ   7.583  8.310  8.652  0 , 7 , 1 ω   0.736  0.908  0.983 
Market Concentration  0 , 8 , 1 ζ   -3.653  -3.340  -3.159  0 , 8 , 1 ω   -0.148 -0.073 0.005 
 
Competitive Adstock. Neither in timing nor size of their advertising actions, brands seem 
to be guided by their competitors. Although it has been shown that advertising clutter lowers 
advertising effectiveness (e.g. Villas-Boas, 1993; Danaher et al., 2008), brands do not refrain 
from spending when competitive advertising actions are likely, neither do they engage in a 
competitive escalation as was argued by Metwally (1978). Although perhaps surprising to some, 
this is in line with research by Steenkamp et al. (2005), indicating that little evidence of 
competitive reactions in advertising could be found to sudden competitive advertising shocks. 
Brands appear not to retaliate with a new own advertising action to those of competitors, nor will 
they spend more when advertising. 
Relative performance evolution. Brands that perform well and gain market share have 
better means to compete. Larger marketing budgets become available (e.g. Allenby and 
  30Hanssens, 2005), enabling them to advertise more often and spend more. Conversely, the idea 
prevails that brands act in order to correct for a negative performance evolution relative to 
competitors (e.g. Metwally, 1978; Armstrong and Collopy, 1996). These theories are countered 
by our findings, as brands do not react with increased spending to make up for short term 
negative sales evolutions. Advertising budgets, on the other hand, are not adjusted immediately 
according to increased sales, leading to overall insignificance of short term performance 
evolution on advertising behavior. Advertising thus proves to be a strategic means of competition 
rather than a short term tactic means. 
New product introduction. Advertising has been shown to be most effective for new 
products (Lodish et al., 1995) as it, e.g., increases trial probability of such products (Steenkamp 
and Gielens, 2003). New products still need to persuade customers into buying them. As 
advertising is an effective means to build awareness and convey product information, new 
products should be advertised more heavily (Tellis, 2004; Kotler and Armstrong, 2005).   
However, although our findings point in that direction, no such significant effects could be found 
on the actual advertising decisions.   
End of year budget depletion. Advertising budgets are mostly set on a yearly basis, based 
on rules of thumb (e.g. percentage of sales of the previous year), formal advertising response 
modeling and management judgments (Farris and West, 2007). During the year, these budgets are 
used for advertising campaigns, driven by a wide set of factors (e.g. Montgomery et al., 2005). 
Thus, these financial resources become depleted. Our results indicate that managers tend to spend 
relatively more in the beginning of the year, making them advertise less often and spending less 
on single actions at the end ( 0 , 6 , 1 ζ = -0.252 and  0 , 6 , 1 ω = -0.017), after accounting for Holiday 
season spending. Having money seemingly leads to spending it. In the beginning of the year, 
resources are still large, so one can more easily engage in more intense actions. As resources get 
depleted, one has to become more careful in when and what to spend, especially if one has spent 
relatively more in the beginning and hence has already used ‘too much’ of the resources.  
Category growth. When category growth is higher, brands will be more inclined to 
advertise ( 0 , 7 , 1 ζ = 8.310), and their subsequent actions will as well be more intense ( 0 , 7 , 1 ω = 
0.908). High growth categories are often younger product categories, requiring more advertising 
to inform and convince new customers (Narayanan et al., 2005). Consumers in more mature 
markets, with lower to zero growth, relay mostly on own experiences, and pay less attention to 
  31advertising (Chandy et al., 2001). Higher growth, in addition, can be considered an indicator of 
potential future profits, leading brands to defend their position even more fiercely (Gatignon et 
al., 1990). 
Category concentration. Economic theory tells that more concentrated markets show 
higher profits as such oligopolistic markets are often characterized by barriers to entry (e.g. Bain, 
1951; Modigliani, 1958; Karakaya and Stahl, 1989). Combined with the easy monitoring of 
competitors’ actions in such markets, this may lead to collusive behavior and the use of non-price 
forms of competition such as advertising in order not to compete away these attractive margins 
(Ramaswamy et al., 1994; Lipczynski and Wilson, 2001). Our findings, however, indicate that 
brands appear to be less inclined to advertise in more concentrated categories ( 0 , 8 , 1 ζ = -3.340). 
This is in line with previous research by Steenkamp et al. (2005) showing less overall 
competitive interaction behavior in such categories. Brands thus advertise less often, although no 
effect on their actual spending when advertising could be found. 
 
Validation 
  To find guidance on the relative performance of our model, we compare the proposed 
model (Model 0) to two other plausible specifications. In the first competing model (Model 1), 
we restrict all covariances between error terms to zero. Model 2 is specified with only the 
Adstock level but without the Ad-sensor, thus only accounting for the state dependency and not 
for the pressure to start or stop advertising. 
  To compare these models, we assess to what extent they are capable of predicting both 
timing and magnitude of advertising actions. We compare the models regarding their 
performance on four different prediction statistics. The first statistic we consider, is the Mean 
Squared Error, one of the most widely used loss functions in statistics. Theil U allows us to judge 
the performance of the models relative to a naïve no-change model. The closer the value to zero, 
the better the model performance over the naïve no-change model in which  . We 
implement the so-called U2 specification (Theil, 1966), which allows to make a distinction 
between models performing better or worse, as it allows values beyond 1. The hit rate provides 
evidence on the percentage correctly predicted Timing (0/1) decisions. Finally, we report the 
correlation between the predicted and observed advertising expenditures. Higher values for the 
1 − = cbt cbt y y
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underlined 
  The model performance statistics are considered both in- and out-of-sample. Indeed, as 
Van Heerde and Bijmolt (2005) argue, such time-based split provides us with a model robustness 
check as the estimation and validation samples may differ in a systematic way. Parameter 
estimates are based on a 130 week (2½ year) estimation period. The remaining 26 weeks (½ year) 
are used as a time hold-out sample. In the spirit of e.g. Brodie and de Kluyver (1987), we include 
observed Competitive Adstock, i.e. we assume that competitive actions are known. An overview 
of these statistics is given in table 5. 
 
Table 5. Model Comparison 
 
Model Description  In-Sample 
        
   MSE  Theil’s  U  Hit  Rate  Correlation 
        
        
Model 0  Proposed model  0.078 0.552 0.891  0.779
        
Model 1  No correlations  0.120  0.684  0.893 0.675 
        
Model  2  No  Ad-sensor  0.094 0.608 0.870 0.739 
        
        
 
Model Description  Out-of-Sample 
        
   MSE  Theil’s  U  Hit  Rate  Correlation 
        
        
Model 0  Proposed model  0.141 0.749 0.829  0.588
        
Model 1  No correlations  1.144  2.130  0.839 0.214 
        
Model  2  No  Ad-sensor  0.152 0.770 0.810 0.540 
        
        
 
In-sample performance 
  Our specification (Model 0) outperforms the alternative specifications on three 
diagnostics with regard to in-sample estimations. Although the hit rate (89%) is slightly lower 
than in model 1, our result is still impressive, especially when compared to the expected result for 
a random model. Given 24% of the observations showing advertising actions, a random model 
would show an overall hit rate of no more than 64% (Morrison, 1969). By means of such random 
model, we would a priori choose to classify α = 24% of the observations as actions. The 
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resulting hit rate would then equal  α) (1 * p) (1 α * p − − + = 0.24*0.24+0.76*0.76 = 0.64. In 
addition, when we decompose our hit rate into the percentage of correctly predicted actions and 
no-actions, we obtain results of 71% and 95% respectively, far beyond the expected values of 
24% and 76%. Besides a good predictor of the timing decisions, our model as well proves high 
in-sample fit when correlating the predicted with the actually observed expenditures, with a 




  The second part of table 5 summarizes the out-of-sample performance statistics of our 
validation models. Here as well, our focal model 0 outperforms the other models on 3 out of the 4 
statistics. The hit rate (about 83%) and correlation (0.588) are still impressive. Decomposition of 
the hit rate shows correct predictions of action in 60% of the cases, and a correct prediction of 
non-actions in 90% of the cases. These are still far beyond the aforementioned expected values of 
24% and 76% of a random model (Morrison, 1969). Overall, this provides evidence of the 
excellent predictive validity of our model specification. 
 
Timing and Magnitude 
  In our study, we allowed for differential decisions processes in the timing and magnitude 
decisions. We already provided evidence of the good performance of our model in predicting the 
timing decisions by means of an impressive hit rate. In addition, we reported the overall 
correlation between observed and predicted advertising values. To more specifically assess the 
relative value of the magnitude part, we now restrict ourselves to those observations for which 
the outcome of the timing decisions was positive. Thus we obtain the following in-sample (out-
of-sample) statistics: MSE = 0.199 (0.330); Theil U = 0.431 (0.548); correlation = 0.512 (0.407). 
These results indicate that the large share of correctly predicted zero advertising in the overall 
sample – and thus the good performance of the timing part – may inflate the overall correlation. 
Our model consequently performs better in predicting the timing of the advertising actions 
relative to predicting the actual amounts spent when advertising.  
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mimicking of advertising decisions in the marketplace. Not accounting for the correlations 
between the error terms generally worsens the performance of our model. Finally, the inclusion 
of our Ad-sensor, capturing the process leading to the start and stop of an advertising campaign, 





Notwithstanding the fact that advertising is one of the most used marketing tools, little is  
known about what is driving the timing and magnitude of advertising actions. Building on 
normative theory, we developed a parsimonious model that captures this dual investment process. 
We explained advertising spending patterns as observed in the market, and investigated the 
impact of company, competitive, and category-related factors on these decisions. Analyses were 
based on a combination of (i) weekly advertising data from a wide variety of CPG brands from 
the UK, (ii) household panel purchase data, and (iii) data on new product introductions. We 
included both large and small brands, both frequent and infrequent advertisers in order to avoid 
data pruning biases, and to obtain a more complete overview of the market. 
The empirical findings provide broad support for our conceptual framework. Adstock and 
Ad-sensor have a positive effect on both timing and magnitude decisions. Advertising spending 
patterns can hence be considered a result of the application of campaigning strategies, based on 
dynamic Adstock management systems. The extent to which such strategies are more or less the 
outcome of such systems, however, varies across brands as a function of their size and 




In this study, we explained observed advertising spending patterns. Even strategies with 
same amounts of advertising in every single week, as were advocated by early normative studies 
(e.g. Zielske, 1959; Sasieni, 1971; 1989), are not observed in real world data. Pulsing strategies 
on the other hand, characterized by an alternation of periods with higher advertising and periods 
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Differing from previous advertising research, we argued these advertising investments to be the 
outcome of a dual decision process, thereby distinguishing between two conceptually different 
but at the same time closely linked decisions: whether to advertise or not (timing), and 
conditional upon the choice to advertise, how much to spend (magnitude). As our results 
indicated, differentiating between these two decisions is warranted. They are partly driven by 
different factors, and common drivers have clearly different weights in both decisions. 
Accounting for differential processes thus allows us to obtain a much richer view as well as a 
more correct understanding of what is driving observed behavior. 
Both decisions were subsequently embedded in an advertising goodwill stock 
management system. Advertising investments are scheduled in campaigns of several weeks, 
during which brands will build advertising goodwill among consumers. Carry-over effects of 
advertising allow for longer periods without advertising, during which the goodwill will 
gradually decay. As such, the created advertising goodwill is managed in a dynamic way. Similar 
to strategies in other inventory management, this process can be described as an (s,S) inventory 
management system, by means of which brands in a systematic way monitor and adjust their 
advertising goodwill stock. Brands will decide to launch a new advertising action as soon as this 
stock falls below a certain minimum desired level s, and stop advertising once the desired 
(higher) target level S was reached. The Ad-sensor concept we developed in this study captures 
this pressure, not only to launch and stop a new campaign, but also to spend more when still far 
away from the target level in order to reach it faster. As such, it provides evidence of the 
dynamics associated with advertising campaigns. The state dependencies of such campaigns, i.e. 
the fact that they last for several weeks and that brands prefer consistent spending strategies 
within each campaign, in turn, are well represented by the Adstock concept. Together, Ad-sensor 
and Adstock allow us to explain observed advertising spending patterns as real-life applications 
of the normative literature, in which advertising and advertising goodwill management are 
embedded in dynamic (s,S) inventory systems. 
However, the extent to which such systems affect the actual advertising decisions clearly 
differs among different types of brands. Larger brands, as well as more frequently advertising 
brands, show a greater reactance to changes in their advertising goodwill. The former have better 
means to do so, whereas the latter may have learned from previous experience, resulting in a 
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evidence that limiting the analyses to only the frequently acting large brands would have biased 
our results. Our flexible model specification, in contrast to previous work, allowed us to cover 
nearly all players in the market, thus avoiding data pruning biases. Given the number of brands 
that otherwise would have been excluded from our analyses, this certainly gives extra weight to 
our empirical generalizations.  
Although advertising is often argued to be driven by competitive reasoning and reaction, 
no such tendencies could be found. Not only did we not find any direct effects of competitive 
advertising in the advertising decision making process, indirect effects through the relative 
performance evolution of the brands did not show significant impact either. This may seem even 
more surprising, as annual advertising budgets are often determined on a percentage of sales basis 
(e.g. Allenby and Hanssens, 2005), and given the well-known argument that companies advertise 
in order to retain market shares (e.g. Metwally, 1978; Armstrong and Collopy, 1996). 
Advertising, characterized by small short run elasticities (e.g. Assmus et al., 1984; Sethuraman 
and Tellis, 1991), takes time to build an effect in the mindset of customers (e.g. Assael, 1998; 
Kardes, 2004). Price promotions, on the other hand, show much higher short run elasiticities 
(Neslin, 2002; Bijmolt et al., 2005), making it a more interesting instrument to make up for 
negative sales evolutions in the short run. This is also in line with the findings by Steenkamp et 
al. (2005) who show that, in contrast to price promotions, advertising will hardly be used as a 
means to react to competitors. Advertising thus appears not to be a tactic means to counter 
negative evolutions in the short run, but rather a strategic means which builds goodwill that lasts. 
Anecdotal evidence from practitioners adds to our findings, as several advertising agency account 
managers confirmed that brands, in general, focus on their own internal advertising utility calculi, 
and much less on what their competitors are doing in their actual advertising decisions. 
Recent research has shown that new product introductions, combined with heavier 
advertising, can result in higher sales and increased shareholder value (see e.g. Pauwels et al., 
2004; Srinivasan et al., 2009), combined with a rejuvenated brand (Slotegraaf and Pauwels, 
2008). This may as well be a consequence of the fact that advertising is especially effective for 
those new products (e.g. Lodish et al., 1995; Steenkamp and Gielens, 2003). However, no 
significant link between such introductions and advertising decisions could be found, although 
there were some weak indications in that direction. Overall, adopted strategies appear to be 
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those that are already present in the portfolio. Brands which already have intense advertising 
strategies in place, are likely to continue these strategies for the new products as well, whereas 
those with lower intensity strategies may simply not have the means to increase their efforts. 
 
Directions for future research 
In this work, we investigated and explained advertising spending patterns as observed in 
the market. We did not aim at modeling the particular decision process of individual managers, 
but mimic the advertising decisions as observed in the market by means of a paramorphic model 
(e.g. Hoffman, 1960; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Steenkamp, 1989). Past research has proven 
that such models, although showing deviations when applied to specific individual reasoning 
processes, perform very well in capturing judgment and decision processes at a higher level (e.g. 
Einhorn et al., 1979). Thus we are able to capture the phenomenon that is taking place in the 
market, abstracting from short term individual deviations. However, this provides an avenue for 
future research focusing on how individual managers in practice decide on their advertising 
actions, and this by means of in-depth personal interactions with individual managers. 
A second limitation of our work, is the fact that we limit ourselves to the dual decision of 
timing and magnitude, thereby aggregating over all media. Media choice as such is not 
investigated. This, however, would represent an interesting area for future research, as not all 
media show the same effectiveness for different product categories, and as synergy effects can be 
present in multimedia communications (see e.g. Naik and Raman, 2003). Moreover, media 
effectiveness is not static, but does evolve as well as a consequence of the appearance of new 
media. These phenomena can have far-reaching implications for the advertising decision process 
and render it even more complicated. 
Computing limitations (with the present runtime of our model on a fast Dell Precision 
Workstation equaling 30 days) made us opt to include only time-invariant moderators in our 
model. However, the inclusion of time-varying moderators like price-promotions would enrich 
our analyses even further, and would also enable us to capture the interplay between Adstock and 
advertising management and other instruments of the marketing mix. 
Finally, we showed that commonly applied data pruning rules may engender results 
which are only valid for that specific subsample of the market, raising questions to the validity of 
  38the corresponding conclusions for the market as a whole. New econometric techniques enable us 
to include all different types of players, even those that would have been excluded by these 
pruning rules. An investigation as to what extent findings of previous research are valid for the 
market as a whole can therefore be suggested. 
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  46Appendix A: Mathematical derivation of Ad-sensor 
 
Ad-sensor captures the dynamics in the evolution of the brand’s Adstock. This Adstock is 
defined as (Broadbent, 1984):  
(A1)   1 , , , ) 1 ( − + − = t b b t b b t b Adstock Advert Adstock λ λ  
 
The first order condition for the optimum, i.e. the maximum Adstock level during a campaign, 
given that we use discrete time observations and we can thus only observe up to time t-1, is: 





Adstock t b  
As we are analyzing discrete time data, this yields 
(A3)   0




Adstock Adstock t b t b  
(A4)     0 2 , 1 , = − ⇔ − − t b t b Adstock Adstock . 
Given (A1), this is satisfied if: 
(A5)   0 ) 1 ( 2 , 2 , 1 , = − + − − − − t b t b b t b b Adstock Adstock Advert λ λ  
(A6)     2 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − = − ⇔ t b b t b b Adstock Advert λ λ  
(A7)     2 , 1 , − − = ⇔ t b t b Adstock Advert  
The second order condition for this maximum at t-1 then requires: 
(A8)   .  3 , 2 , − − > t b t b Adstock Advert
because Adstock will increase as long as Advertising is larger than Adstock: 
(A9)     2 , 1 , − − > t b t b Adstock Adstock
(A10)     2 , 2 , 1 , ) 1 ( − − − > + − ⇔ t b t b b t b b Adstock Adstock Advert λ λ  
(A11)     2 , 1 , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − > − ⇔ t b b t b b Adstock Advert λ λ  
(A12)       2 , 1 , − − > ⇔ t b t b Adstock Advert
The starting point for our Ad-sensor at time t is hence: 
(A13)     > 0 if the maximum is reached after time t-1;   2 , 1 , − − − t b t b Adstock Advert
= 0 if the maximum is reached in t-1;  
< 0 if the maximum was reached before t-1. 
  47We subsequently rewrite (A1) in function of  :  1 , − t b Advert
(A14)  
) 1 (
2 , 1 ,
1 ,
b












(A15)   2 , 1 , − − − t b t b Adstock Advert 2 ,













(A16)                2 , 2 , 1 , ) 1 ( − − − − − − ≈ t b b t b b t b Adstock Adstock Adstock λ λ  
or 
(A13)   2 , 1 , − − − t b t b Adstock Advert 2 , 1 , − − − ≈ t b t b Adstock Adstock  
 
We therefore define our Ad-sensor variable as the difference between Adstock in time t-1 and 
Adstock in t-2: 
(A17)   2 , 1 , , − − − = t b t b t b Adstock Adstock Adsensor  
 
Ad-sensor thus captures the dynamics in the evolution of a brand’s Adstock. In the beginning of a 
campaign, Adstock will increase very fast, causing high values of Ad-sensor. Closer to the 
maximum, increases will become smaller as Adstock approaches the Advertising values. As a 
consequence, the value of Ad-sensor starts to decrease. Once beyond the maximum, Adstock 
starts to decline, and Ad-sensor takes relatively strong negative values. Adstock decays at a 
constant rate λ, but not in constant absolute terms. When Adstock levels are still high, decay will 
be large in absolute terms, causing strong negative Ad-sensor values. Over time, the Adstock 
level becomes smaller, and decay will be smaller in absolute terms. The Ad-sensor values will 
become less negative, indicating a growing pressure to start advertising again.  
  48Appendix B: Numerical example of the Adstock and Ad-sensor development 
 
Week Advertising  Adstock Ad-sensor s  S 
1 0.00  0.00 0.00 5.00  197.65 
2 0.00  0.00 0.00 5.00 197.65 
3 0.00  0.00 0.00 5.00 197.65 
4 120.00  36.00 0.00 5.00 197.65 
5 200.00  85.20 36.00 5.00 197.65 
6 240.00  131.64 49.20 5.00 197.65 
7 230.00  161.15 46.44 5.00 197.65 
8 240.00  184.80 29.51 5.00 197.65 
9 210.00  192.36 23.66 5.00 197.65 
10 210.00  197.65 7.56 5.00 197.65 
11 190.00  195.36 5.29 5.00 197.65 
12 110.00  169.75 -2.31 5.00 197.65 
13 80.00  142.83 -25.61 5.00 197.65 
14 50.00  114.98 -26.93 5.00 197.65 
15 0.00  80.48 -27.85 5.00 197.65 
16 0.00  56.34 -34.49 5.00 197.65 
17 0.00  39.44 -24.15 5.00 197.65 
18 0.00  27.61 -16.90 5.00 197.65 
19 0.00  19.32 -11.83 5.00 197.65 
20 0.00  13.53 -8.29 5.00 197.65 
21 0.00  9.47 -5.80 5.00 197.65 
22 0.00  6.63 -4.06 5.00 197.65 
23 0.00  4.64 -2.84 5.00 197.65 
24 0.00  3.25 -1.99 5.00 197.65 
25 0.00  2.27 -1.39 5.00 197.65 
 
We first simulate an average advertising campaign. These advertising expenditures are given in 
the second column. We subsequently calculate the Adstock (with imposed carry-over λ = 0.70) 
and Ad-sensor series.  
 
For period 6, these are: 
  Adstock6 = (1-0.70)*240.00-0.70*85.20 = 131.64 
  Ad-sensor6 = 85.20-36.00 = 49.20 
 
For period 11, these are: 
  Adstock11 = (1-0.70)*190.00-0.70*197.65 = 195.36 
Ad-sensor11 = 197.65-192.36 = 5.29 
  49For period 12, these are: 
  Adstock12 = (1-0.70)*110.00-0.70*195.36= 169.75 
  Ad-sensor12 = 195.36-197.65 = -2.31 
 
For period 15, these are: 
Adstock15 = (1-0.70)*0.00-0.70*114.98 = 80.48 
Ad-sensor15 = 142.83-114.98 = -27.85 
 
For period 16, these are: 
  Adstock16 = (1-0.70)*0.00-0.70*80.48 = 56.34 
  Ad-sensor16 = 114.98-80.48 = -34.49 
 
For period 20, these are: 
  Adstock20 = (1-0.70)*0.00-0.70*19.32 = 13.53 
  Ad-sensor20 = 19.32-27.61 = -8.29 
 
The highest observed Adstock level in this series equals 197.65. We consequently assume that 
this was the desired maximum level S. In this simulation, we impose s=5. In practice, we do not 
know s and S, and derive these from the observed patterns. In addition, we estimate λ for each 
individual brand. 
  50Appendix C: MCMC Estimation of a Hierarchical Multivariate Type-2 Tobit Model  
 
We will first briefly repeat the model specification. 
An advertising decision in category c by brand b in week t ( ) is described by a multivariate 
probit model: 
cbt z












The latent variable  is modeled through a linear model: 
*
cbt z





* ζ x ζ x
Conditional on the decision to advertise (  = 1), we model  , the ln of spending by brand b 
in category c during week t as: 
cbt z cbt y




1 ω v ω v
where  
(C4)  ~   )' , (
' '
ct ct μ ε ) , 0 ( Σ MVN
We relate the response parameters   and   to a set of second stage variables.  cb 1 ζ cb 1 ω
(C5)  cb cb cb u ζ Q ζ + = 1  
(C6)  cb cb cb e ω R ω + = 1  
where 
(C7)  ~ .  )' , (
' '
cb cb u e ) , 0 ( Ω MVN
 
We stack the dependent variables of equations (C2) and (C3) for all brands b in category c 
and time periods t so that the vector of ln expenditures is   and the vector 
of advertising action indicator variables is  , (b) the predictor variables for 
the advertising action equation,   = [ v
] , , , [ 12 11 ′ = T cB c c c c y y y K y





* ′ = T cB c c c c z z z K z
'
1cbt v 1cb1t,v1cb2t,…, v1cbMt ]′ and   = [ v
'
2cbt v 2cb1t,v2cb2t,…, v2cbMt 
]′ ; the predictor variables for the ln expenditures equation,   = [x
'
1cbt x 1cb1t,x1cb2t,…,x1cbMt ]′ and 
 = [x
'
2cbt x 2cb1t,x2cb2t,…,x2cbMt ]′; and  (c) the error terms of these two equations for all brands b and 
  51time periods t so that [ ]’= [ε ct ct ' μ ε , ′ c1t,εc2t,…,εcBct, µc1t,µc2t,…,µcBct]′ follows a (2BBc)-variate normal 
distribution with zero mean and full covariance matrix  












where  ,  c E ct ct c ∀ ′ = ) ( 11 ε ε Σ c E ct ct c ∀ = ) ' ( 12 μ ε Σ , and  c E ct ct c ∀ = ) ' ( 22 μ μ Σ , which has ones on the 
diagonal since each selectivity mechanism is binary.  
 
 
  Next we specify the hierarchies associated with the two advertising decisions. We stack 
(i) the parameter coefficients per category and per brand across equations (C2) and (C3) and (ii) 
the error terms of the hierarchical equations for all brands b in a similar way. We model the 
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,  
with   =  =  cb Q cb R cb M q I ′ ⊗ , where  is an (M x M) identity matrix and  is a 1 x (N/M) 
vector of covariates. The hyperparameters relating these covariates to the actual first level 
response parameters are stacked in [
M I cb q′
' ω ' ζ ]’= 
[ ] M ,N M 2,1 M 1,N 1,2 1,1 M M,N 2,1 M 1,N 1,2 1,1 ζ ,ζ ζ ,ζ ,ζ ω ,ω ω ,ω ω / 1 1 / 1 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 1 K K K K , with ω and ζ both 
being (N x 1) vectors. 












b c E cb cb , ) (
'
11 ∀ = e e Ω b c E cb cb , ) ' ( 12 ∀ = u e Ω , 
and  .   b c E cb cb , ) ' ( 22 ∀ = u u Ω
  We use an MCMC approach to estimate the marginal distributions of the latent dependent 
variables, parameters and covariances. The MCMC algorithm involves sampling sequentially 
from the relevant conditional distributions over a large number of iterations. These draws can be 
  52shown to converge to the marginal posterior distributions. Our implementation of the MCMC 
algorithm has 6 steps that are described below. 
 
Conditional distributions 
The first implementation step requires that we specify conditional distributions of the 
relevant variables. The solutions of these distributions follow from the normality assumption of 
the disturbances terms. We employ natural conjugate priors. Specifications of the conditional 
distributions are as follows: 
1.  is y
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As the notation suggests, the vector and ∑
*
ct y c matrix are partitioned between the brand of 
interest,  cb, and all other brands cj,  j  ≠ b (the entries in ∑c corresponding to z are not 
shuffled). Without loss of generality, we have assumed the brand of interest to be the first. 




ct z c. 
 
2.  We next draw the latent dependent variable values for the probit component of the model. If 
the indicator variable zcbt = 1, then   is drawn from a normal distribution, truncated below 
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The latent probit dependent variables are drawn using the inverse cdf method. 
 
3.  The parameters in []
′
, 1 1 2 1 2 1 , 1 1 1 1 , , , , ,
c c cB cB c c c c ζ ω ζ ω ζ ω K are drawn from a SUR model with 
variance/covariance matrix of disturbances  :       c Σ






































































































































































































































c c c c c




































































































c cB c cB c cB c cB
c cB c cB c cB c cB
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  554.  The vector of hyper-parameters, [ ]
′ ′ ′ ζ ω , , is drawn from a SUR model with 
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with B the sum of all BBc  and hence the total number of brands. 
 
5.  The vector of parameters, []
′
, 2 2 2 2 2 2 , 1 2 1 2 , , , , ,
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6.  is drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution with T c Σ c+νΣ degrees of freedom: 






















∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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(t) (t) (t) *(t) *(t) t (t) (t
c c c c c , ν T ~Wish  ,ν , , , , μ ε
μ
ε
V V V ψ δ z y ζ ω Σ  
7.   is drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution with B+ν Ω Ω degrees of freedom. 
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−
1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 ' ' , , , u e
u
e
V V ζ ζ ω ω Ω , ν B ~Wish  ,ν ,
t t t t (t) . 
  58For identification purposes we need ones on the diagonal of incidence equation error 
matrix   (while Σ c E ct ct c ∀ = ) ' ( 22 μ μ Σ c is positive definite), and we need to rescale the parameters 
from the incidence equation relative to . To achieve this, we follow the procedure proposed 
by Edwards and Allenby (2003) and Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005, p. 108). That is, we 
do not impose any restrictions when drawing . Instead, we postprocess the draws using the 
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4   
After completing the Gibbs chain, we calculate for each saved Gibbs draw, 




c c c c C Σ C Σ ′ =
















2 ζ ω C ζ ω ) , .( * ) , ( 3 ′ ′ ′ = ′ ′ ′ ζ ω C ζ ω , 
and  .  4 4
* C Ω C Ω ′ =
Prior distributions 
The second implementation step is to specify prior distributions for the parameters of 
interest. Note that the priors are set to be non-informative so that inferences are driven by the 
data. 
  59The prior distribution of [ω′,ζ′]’ is N([ω′, ζ′]’,Ω ), where [ω′, ζ′]=0 and Ω  = diag(10
3). 
The prior distribution of   is Wishart: W(ν
1 −
c Σ Σc,VΣc), where νΣ = 2 Bc +2 and VΣc = diag(10
-3). 
The prior distribution of   is Wishart: W(ν
1 - Ω ω, ), where ν Ω V ω = 2M+2 and   = diag(10 Ω V
-3). 
Initial values 
The third implementation step is to set initial values for the parameters of the marginal 
distributions. The starting values for ω and δ  are computed by OLS, using ln(ycbt) as the 
dependent variable of the regression. The covariance matrix, Σ11, is initiated by computing the 
sample covariances of this regression’s residuals. In a similar fashion, the starting values for the 
patronage equation parameters, ζ, are computed by OLS, using zcbt as the dependent variable, and 
the residuals from this regression, µcbt, are used to compute the sample correlations, which serve 
as the initial value for Σ22.  
  The final step is to generate N1+N2 random draws from the conditional distributions. We 
use a “burn in” of N1 = 30.000 iterations. To reduce autocorrelation in the MCMC draws, we 
“thin the line,” using every 50th draw in the final N2 = 30.000 draws for our estimation. In this 
way, 600 draws are used to estimate marginal posterior distributions of the parameters of interest. 
Test runs of our Gauss implementation of the MCMC draws show that we can retrieve 
parameters used to simulate artificial data. 
 
  60Appendix D: MCMC estimation of brand-specific carry-over parameter lambda 
 
Basic sales model for each brand: 
(D1)     t cb t cb cb cb t cb Adstock Sales , , , ε β α + + =
We transform this model: 
(D2)    
*
, 1 , , 1 , , ) 1 ( t cb t cb cb cb t cb cb cb cb t cb cb t cb Adstock Adstock Sales Sales ε β λ β α λ λ + − + − = − − −
Adstock definition: 
(D3)    ) ( ) 1 ( 1 , , , − + − = t cb cb t cb cb t cb Adstock Adv Adstock λ λ
Inserting this in the transformed model: 
(D4)   
*
, , 1 , , ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t cb t cb cb cb cb cb t cb cb t cb Adv Sales Sales ε λ β α λ λ + − + − = − −
 or 




1 , , t cb t cb cb cb t cb cb t cb Adv Sales Sales ε β α λ + + = − −
 or 
(D6)   
*
, 1 , ,
* *
, t cb t cb cb t cb cb cb t cb Sales Adv Sales ε λ β α + + + = −
which is the well-known Partial Adjustment Model (Hanssens et al., 2001 p147). From this 




, 1 , ,
* *
, t cb t cb cb t cb cb cb t cb Sales Adv Sales ε λ β α + + + = − , with  ~    ct ε ) , (
λ
c MVN Σ 0
and 
α α α cb cb e + =
*  
 
β β β cb cb e + =
*  
 
λ λ λ cb cb e + =  with  ~   )' , , (
λ β α
cb cb cb e e e ) , ( λ Ω 0 MVN
 
1.  We draw the vector of parameters [ ]
′










1 K  from a SUR 
model with variance/covariance matrix of disturbances : 
λ
c Σ
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2.  The vector of hyper-parameters, [ ]
′
λ β α , , is drawn from a SUR model with 
variance/covariance matrix of disturbances  :  λ Ω
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 where  ()
1 1 1) (
− − − + ⊗ ′ λ λ Ω G Ω I G B 3 I 1 = F , and G = ⊗ B , with B the sum of all Bc and hence 
  the total number of brands. 
 
3.  We subsequently draw   from an inverted Wishart distribution with  degrees of 
freedom:  
λ
c Σ λ ν
c c T
Σ +
   λ λ
λ
c c
t t t t
c Σ Σ
− ν V Sales λ β α Σ , , , , ,








' , c c c
c c T Wish ε ε V λ λ ν  
 
4.   is drawn from an inverted Wishart distribution with  degrees of freedom:  λ Ω
λ νΩ + B
  
λ λ λ Ω Ω
− ν V λ β α λ β α Ω , , , , , , ,




Ω Ω + + e e V
λ λ ν B Wish  
 
5.  We specify prior distributions for the parameters of interest. These are set to be non-
informative so that inferences are driven by the data.  
  The prior distribution of   is Wishart: 
1 − λ
c Σ ( ) λ λ ν
c c W
Σ Σ V , ,  
 where  λ ν
c Σ = 2Bc+2 and  = diag(10 λ
c Σ V
-3). 
  The prior distribution of   is Wishart: 
1 −
λ Ω ( )
λ λ ν Ω Ω V , W ,  
  63 where 




  64Appendix E: Operationalization of the variables 
 
              
     Variable  Measurement 
              
      
 
   
  Adstock management   
 Adstock     ) ( ) 1 ( 1 , , , − + − = t cb cb t cb cb t cb Adstock Adv Adstock λ λ  
 Ad-sensor     2 , 1 , , − − − = − t b t b t b Adstock Adstock sensor Ad  
     
 Moderators      
  Brand market share    Average volume share over the 156 weeks estimation period (cfr. Gatignon et al., 1990) 
  Advertising frequency  Percentage of time the brand was advertised during the 52 weeks initialization period 
      
  Company factors    
  New product introduction  Dummy variable; 1 = if within four weeks after product introduction, 0 = otherwise 
  End of year budget depletion  Dummy variable; 1 = if within last four  weeks of the year, 0 = otherwise 
        
  Competitive factors    




t i t i t b Adstock ms k CompAdstoc , , , *  
  Relative performance evolution  First difference of the log-transformed volume share (cfr. Franses and Koop, 1998) 
      
  Category factors    
  Category growth    First difference of the log-transformed category volume sales (cfr. Franses and Koop, 1998) 
  Category concentration    Herfindahl index of volume shares of the brand over a moving window of previous 26 weeks 
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